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Technological change has brought about rapid changes in the world of work over the past decade. 
The World Bank’s World Development Report 2019: The Changing Nature of Work is a welcome 
contribution as it discusses the transformations that are taking place and tries to advise 
governments on how best to adapt to them. The report also brings out the concern related to the 
growing risks associated with tax evasion by large corporations that control the market power and 
have an ever-greater share of economic activity. However, the report is flawed in many ways as it 
portrays these changes in the nature of work as essentially benign, requiring “adaptation” and skills 
acquisition by workers facilitated by the provision of skills and “universal” social coverage by 
governments, with the latter understood as a prelude to labour-market deregulation. Such a narrow 
perspective ignores the growing body of research that points to very serious risks and challenges 
faced by workers in ensuring decent working conditions due to technological changes. This article 
provides a critique of the World Bank report by focusing on five areas related to technology and 
the future of work that are fundamental for ensuring minimum standards for workers and to ensure 
social cohesion: inequality, jobs, labour regulations, trade unions and social protection.  
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As the International Labour Organization (ILO) enters into its hundredth year, a considerable 
amount of attention is being placed on what the coming decades might look like for workers in the 
global economy. Most observers seem to agree that technological advances will play an important 
role in this future, but there remains an important debate regarding how technology will impact 
work. The World Bank (2018b) made a notable contribution to this discussion when it released 
World Development Report 2019: The Changing Nature of Work (hereafter the Report or WDR). 
Opposing doom-and-gloom claims that jobs are about to be destroyed on a large scale, the Report 
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presents a notably optimistic view of the future, emphasising how fears about automation and 
digitalisation are unfounded and that technology will bring new opportunities to society by helping 
to create jobs, increase productivity and deliver effective public services. The key for such positive 
outcomes to materialise, according to the WDR, lies in adapting to the changes brought about by 
technological change, in particular through investment in education (for workers) and a 
transformation of social policy that would see governments provide “universal” coverage in order 
to relieve corporations from the burden of financing social protection. 
This article presents a different interpretation of the potential impact of technology on work, 
one that is considerably more nuanced and leads to recommendations that go beyond adaptation, 
stressing instead the need to influence, and probably challenge, the direction of technological 
change. It is argued here that which technology is used, how it is used and to what end (e.g., its 
disributional consequences) are shaped by power relations in society. When workers are organised 
and given a voice in processes of work transformation, and when governments actively support 
that process of worker engagement, then technology has the potential to play a positive role in the 
future of work. In contrast, when worker organisation and participation are curtailed, and when 
employers prioritise (and the state facilitates) short-term economic gains over long-term, 
sustainable growth, then it can be anticipated that technology can exacerbate inequality, adversely 
affect the terms and conditions of employment, and have deleterious impacts on social protection. 
Indeed, this is what we have seen in many countries over the past several decades.  
In the sections that follow, the article develops this argument by exploring five aspects covered 
by the Report: inequality, jobs, labour regulations, trade unions and social protection. The final 




Technology and Inequality 
Perhaps no question is of greater urgency when analysing technology and work than who will gain 
and who might potentially lose. That is, what are the potential distributional consequences of new 
work-related technologies? The World Bank (2018b: 9) takes the optimistic view that innovation 
has transformed living standards and, as a result, “inequality in most emerging economies has 
declined or remained unchanged over the last decade”. This finding is based on an approach to 
inequality through the within-country lens of the Gini coefficient, which draws on household 
surveys. However, if one were to draw on tax data, then one would observe a sharp increase in 
functional income distribution between capital and labour in the last forty years, with a dramatic 
enrichment at the very top related to increased revenue derived from capital (Piketty, 2014).  
More recently, and in direct contrast to the World Bank’s statement above, Piketty and his 
collaborators, through their World Inequality Database,2 find that “in recent decades, income 
inequality has increased in nearly all countries, but at different speeds, suggesting that institutions and 
policies matter in shaping inequality” (Alvaredo et al., 2018: 5, emphasis ours). In terms of emerging 
economies, they find that since 1980 income inequality has increased rapidly in China, India and 
Russia. In the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and Brazil, “income inequality has remained 
relatively stable, at extremely high levels” (Alvaredo et al., 2018: 5, emphasis ours). Their data on 
income inequality in emerging economies (such as China, India and Russia) shows that the income 
share of the top 10 per cent has risen sharply over the past three decades (see Figure 1).  
                                                 








Figure 1: Income inequality in emerging market economies 
 
 
In the case of Brazil (prior to the recent change in government), the stabilising of inequality 
was the result of government policies and institutions. Notably, the Lula government implemented 
an aggressive programme of transfers to the poorest segments of society, while supporting the 
process of labour formalisation, raising the minimum wage on a regular basis; in a context where 
trade unions remain among the strongest in the region, they were increasingly able to negotiate 
wage increases above the inflation rate (Anner and Veiga, 2013; Beccaria, Maurizio and Vazquez, 
2014; Maurizio, 2014). During this same period, the government significantly enhanced the labour 
inspection system through considerable investments which resulted in increased number of 
workplaces being inspected for labour rights violations (Gindling, Mossaad and Trejos, 2013; Rani, 
Belser, Oelz and Ranjbar, 2013). That is, it was not neo-liberal reforms that stabilised inequality, 
but rather the policies of a labour-party government and the actions of strong trade unions.  
The Report highlights declining inequality in Russia. It states, “In the Russian Federation … 
between 2008 and 2015, the share of income of the top 10 percent of the population (based on 
pretax income) fell from 52 to 46 percent” (World Bank, 2018b: 9). The reason for this change, 
the World Bank argues, is rising employment in small firms. Yet, there are two concerns with this 
finding and argument. First, instead of reviewing data from the last decade, the World Bank picked 
as its starting point inequality in 2008, the year in which inequality peaked in Russia. If the World 
Bank had used its original timeframe to measure changes in inequality of the “last decade” and 
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per cent, hardly a dramatic drop. More important, this 1 per centage point decline takes place after 
inequality doubled in Russia from 1990. Moreover, the recent decline in inequality takes place in the 
context of economic crisis. From 2008 to 2009, inequality dropped in Russia from 52.1 per cent to 
49.6 per cent. During that same period, GDP growth went from 5.2 per cent to –7.8 per cent.3 As 
Piketty (2014) has shown, inequality tends to go down during periods of economic decline because 
the rich lose more relative to the poor during crises. If we look at India, whose economy grew by 
8.5 per cent in 2009 and has continued to grow by over 5 per cent every year since, the share of 
national income going to the top 10 per cent increased from 45.5 per cent in 2005 to 56.1 per cent 
in 2015.  
The change in wealth inequality is more significant and socially more important than that of 
income inequality, because the better-off in society rely less on income from a paycheck and more 
on other sources of wealth, including inherited wealth and returns on financial investments. 
Unfortunately, the World Inequality Database project has not yet been able to gather data on wealth 
inequality for most emerging and developing countries. However, the two countries for which 
wealth inequality data do exist are Russia and China. What the data show is a steady rise in wealth 
inequality in China, and this is during a period of rapid economic growth and technological 
development. In 1995 the top 10 per cent of the population held 40.8 per cent of the wealth, 
whereas in 2015 they held 67.4 per cent of the wealth. In Russia, there are fluctuations, with the 
overall trend toward an increase in wealth inequality. Most notably, we see a significant increase in 
wealth inequality over the past decade, with the top 10 per cent holding 65.7 per cent of the wealth 
in 2005 and 71.3 per cent in 2015 [see Figure 2]. Despite the existence of these data on wealth 




Figure 2: Wealth inequality in China and Russia 
 
 
Recent research from Oxfam International (2018) confirms this trend, showing that the richest 
1 per cent control 82 per cent of global wealth. Moreover, a declining Gini index has in some cases 
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co-existed with rising income and wealth concentration at the top, for instance in Brazil (Morgan, 
2017). Even when focusing on the evolution of the Gini index alone, the ILO (2017a: 6–7) finds, 
“Within-country inequality, as measured by the Gini index, has also grown in most regions … 
Additionally, with the exception of Latin America, all other regions have experienced an increase 
in income inequality along with a decline in labour income share”. 
The WDR has little to say about inequality and gender. Yet, as an IMF Staff Discussion Note 
report indicates, gender inequality is strongly associated with income inequality (Gonzales et al., 
2015). Indeed, gender wage gaps are found to contribute directly to income inequality (Gonzales 
et al., 2015: 6). The World Bank Report has even less to say about inequality and race, caste and 
ethnicity. However, as Naila Kabeer (2016) has shown, gender inequality interacts with race, caste 
and ethnicity, resulting in persistent and lingering effects of “intersecting inequality” .  
And while the World Bank (2018b: 18) observes, “Technology has brought higher labor 
productivity to many sectors by reducing the need for workers for routine tasks”, the ILO finds,  
 
Labour productivity growth outpaced the growth of real wages in all but a few years between 2006 
and 2015.… This means that although workers have become increasingly productive, the benefits of 
their work have increasingly accrued to capital income and to those at the top of the income 
distribution (ILO, 2017a: 6).  
 
What the World Bank Report ignores are the implications on market power and how technology 
is enabling some of the big players to increase their monopoly power (Mazzucato, 2016). This 
apolitical perspective on technological change conceals the crucial and fierce struggles that are 
taking place behind the facade of “market adjustments”. 
Of course, there are important variations across countries and regions. ILO data indicate that 
in several countries, labour’s share of national income has increased since 2005.4 This includes 
many eastern European countries, as well as in Norway, Switzerland, France, Luxemburg and 
Sweden. It is notable that many of the countries with an increase in income share going to labour 
have strong unions and/or high rates of collective bargaining coverage. Countries with weaker 
unions, a lower rate of collective bargaining coverage and/or significant declines in collective 
bargaining coverage – such as Greece, Mexico and the United States – saw a decline in labour’s 
share of national income  
Neo-liberal capitalism may have brought periods of growth to certain sectors of the global 
economy, but, in the absence of strong trade unions and progessive state intervention, it has done 
so at the cost of growing inequality. And, as the Asian financial crisis of 1998 and the global 
recession of 2008 illustrate, it has also exacerbated economic instability. This is the logical 
consequence of an economic system that has failed to provide economic and social security to the 
majority of the world’s population. At the root of this is a growing power imbalance between capital 
and labour. This is particularly noticeable in global supply chains in which multinational lead-firms 
have amassed enormous market value while workers at the bottom of these chains are paid less 
than their subsistence costs (Anner, 2011; Selwyn, 2017). Recent economic trends have led the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) itself to question its core policies (Ostry, Loungani and Furceri, 
2016). Many of these policies’ victims have had no choice but to emigrate, with, for example, as 
much as a quarter of Salvadorians leaving their country in search of a better future. Indeed, some 
countries have experienced declines in poverty not because neo-liberal policies have worked, but 
rather because neo-liberal policies have forced so many workers to emigrate and the remittances 
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of these migrants have reduced poverty in their home countries. The World Bank (2018a) itself has 
estimated that remittances to low- and middle-income countries totalled over USD 465 billion in 
2017. World Bank (2019) data also indicate that for over thirty countries, family remittances 
account for more than 10 per cent of GDP. In sum, a more thorough exploration of inequality 
trends suggests that neo-liberal policies have not contributed to declining inequality in most 
countries.  
This observation in turn suggests that the Report’s optimistic perspective regarding the likely 
impact of technology on inequality may be inaccurate. Indeed, as Hyman (2018) observes in his 
study on the rise of “temp” work in the United States, “new” technologies and forms of 
employment are not separated from past trends. He locates in the early 1950s the beginning of a 
(corporate-driven) “second industrial revolution” that paved the way for the subsequent 
fragmentation of work, with the rise of temporary and insecure work, mediated through ever-leaner 
corporations and subcontracting arrangements. Technology, in other words, is not an exogenous 
force, but one shaped by human decisions. As we will see in the next section, there is growing 
evidence that the “changing” nature of work is deepening the precarious character of employment. 
 
 
Technology and Jobs 
The WDR argues that fears of job loss due to automation and digitalisation are misplaced, and it 
cites numerous examples of jobs being created by automation. Two observations are in order. First, 
the assumption is that past impacts of automation are able to predict future trends. However, the 
impact of automation and robotisation on job creation is ambiguous and the empirical evidence is 
quite mixed. Frey and Osborne (2015) show that 47 per cent of workers in the US are at high risk 
of having jobs replaced by automation, while the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD, 2016) shows that on average only 9 per cent of jobs are at risk of 
automation. They further show that between 50 per cent and 70 per cent of jobs will not be 
substituted entirely, and that a substantial share of these tasks might be automated, transforming 
the way these jobs are carried out and changing the occupations. There is also some firm-level 
evidence which shows that automated robots (such as the kiva system) for logistical purposes in 
company warehouses such as Amazon require far fewer workers to handle goods than before 
(Brynjolffson and McAfee, 2014). So, the extent to which there will be job loss depends upon the 
country and sector. 
The second observation regards the quality of work that will be generated, as there is an 
assumption in the WDR that they would be of higher quality on average, as they would entail 
greater cognitive skills. The past decades have already witnessed a rising trend towards non-
standard forms of employment and informal employment in both advanced and developing 
economies (ILO, 2016, 2018). In developing economies, traditional forms of informal labour 
continue to persist, and in most of these countries over half of all workers are informally employed 
as casual day labourers, contract workers, industrial outworkers or home based workers; without a 
clear employer–employee relationship, they do not receive any labour or social protection from 
their employers (ILO, 2018). In the advanced economies, there is a rise in non-standard forms of 
work such as outsourcing, and flexible and temporary work. Temporary employment levels have 
increased by 5.5 and 6.4 percentage points over the past two decades in the European Union and 
Canada and part-time employment, which is involuntary in nature, increased two-fold in Spain and 
Slovakia over the past decade. Part-time work has not only grown in importance over the past 
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time”, “marginal part-time” and “on-call work”. On-call work, including zero-hour contracts, has 
brought in variability and unpredictability in work and hours, and is more prevalent in the service 
sector (transport, public administration and health), construction and agriculture. On average, 2.5 
per cent of employees in Europe had on-call work, with the highest incidence recorded in the 
Netherlands and Slovenia in 2004 (ILO, 2016). In addition, there has been a rise in temporary 
agency work and “disguised employment”, wherein employees are falsely classified as 
“independent” or “self-employed”, with the consequence that they do not enjoy their rights as 
employees (ILO, 2016).  
Finally, and very much building on the latter trend, the past decade has observed the growth 
of “on-demand” or “gig economy” workers, who are classified as “independent contractors”; 
estimates of such forms of employment vary between 1 per cent and 10 per cent of the adult 
population in the European Union (European Parliament, 2017; Pesole et al., 2018). In addition, 
businesses are increasingly adopting a diversified workforce, which includes workers on formal 
contracts (core), temporary contracts, short-term contracts, on-call and gig or platform economy 
(Deloitte, 2017); this trend raises a significant issue with regard to the quality of employment that 
will be generated. Hence, in the absence of adequate opportunities, “many of those who are at risk 
of job loss may be forced to take lower skilled and lower paying jobs” (ILO, 2017a: 26). In other 
words, while technological innovation may or may not result in a net loss of jobs in society, we 
need to consider the quality of jobs that will emerge. Much of the evidence that points to a decline 
in the quality of work is ignored by the World Bank report. 
The declining job security along with the low incomes that many of these workers receive 
increase precariousness and force them to accept any jobs. In the on-demand or gig economy, 
there is empirical evidence that shows that a large pool of the educated workforce are performing 
microtasks5 on platforms, often in the absence of employment opportunities, or to complement 
income from other paid jobs (Rani and Furrer, 2019). These jobs are heralded for their flexibility, 
and are assumed to provide an opportunity for workers to undertake tasks from any location, 
whenever they want, but in reality a majority of these people work long and unsocial hours, with a 
negative impact on their work–life balance (Berg et al., 2018). The incomes they earn on average 
are quite low. The levels of precarity and vulnerability experienced by these workers are worrying 
as the work is irregular and they spend on average one-third of their time just looking for tasks or 
doing unpaid work (Rani and Furrer, 2019).  
The gig economy represents just one form of what David Weil (2014: 8) refers to as the 
“fissured workplace” in which companies shift “activities once considered central to operations to 
other organizations in order to convert employer–employee relationships into arm’s-length market 
transactions”. Fissuring takes on three forms that have been growing over time: outsourcing, 
franchising and supply chains. The result, Weil argues, has been deteriorating wages and working 
conditions and an increase in precarious and insecure employment. More broadly, fissuring is 
associated with redistribution away from workers and toward investors, contributing to a widening 
income gap in society (Weil, 2014). Hence, there are valid reasons to fear that recent trends, such 
as the declining share of wages in total income, will be exacerbated by the changing nature of work 
unless current tendencies are counter-balanced by a mix of greater regulation and stronger voice 
by workers.  
And yet, the way in which technology is transforming work appears to be limiting workers’ 
                                                 
5 Microtasks include image identification, transcription and annotation, content moderation, data collection 
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voices. The advances in information and communications technology, with the help of advanced 
algorithms and analytical tools, have revolutionised surveillance mechanisms, through which every 
action and behaviour of workers can be monitored. The argument for such control through 
surveillance mechanisms is to improve efficiency, performance and productivity. There has been 
an increasing trend of tracking employees through sociometric badges or biometric scanners, 
monitoring computer keystrokes, and surveilling with video cameras. Large companies such as 
Amazon and Walmart use such technologies to monitor workers’ productivity in warehouses 
(Head, 2014). The decision-making power of such technological adoption is wielded by employers, 
weakening the power of the workers and diminishing any avenues for resistance. Workers are not 
only excluded from decisions about how technology is deployed; technology is often used to 
monitor their activities so as to limit their ability to organise collectively. Some of these monitoring 
technologies at the workplace can thus violate the fundamental rights to dignity, freedom of 
association and autonomy. As Figueroa points out,  
 
In the workplace data is used to resolve problems for employers. It could be used to make work 
processes more pleasant … but in capitalism technology is usually used to make a process cheaper, 
not safer or more pleasant, as there is no money in that (Figueroa, 2018: 4, emphasis ours). 
 
This leads us to a further remark relating to the kind of skills that will be needed by workers in 
future. Digitialisation and automation also allow the possibility to fragment tasks and deskill 
workers, as most of these tasks require minimal expertise and prevent workers from honing their 
skills or having career mobility. This can be observed in the gig economy, wherein a majority of 
the microtasks on digital platforms are simple and repetitive, and do not require any specific 
skills, and do not provide an prospects for future career development (Rani and Furrer, 2019). 
The WDR takes for granted the problematic way (as we have shown) in which the new gig 
economy operates; it therefore emphasises the need to develop the skills currently demanded by 
leading corporations. Socio-behavioural skills, for instance, are indeed crucial, but they raise the 
possibility of exacerbating mechanisms of worker control. If an Uber driver, or a babysitter 
employed through a platform, complains about unpaid overtime, customers are likely to rate 
them badly, thus compromising the worker’s ability to find work in future. Yet, is being treated 
fairly an unreasonable expectation? It is easy to see that the answer may be yes in the not so 
distant future unless workers are empowered to shape the development, adoption and adaptation 
of new technologies. Moreover, there is a gender aspect to digitalisation. As the ILO’s Global 
Commission on the Future of Work has found, “Left to its current course, the digital economy is 
likely to widen both regional and gender divides” (Global Commission, 2019: 18, emphasis ours). 
This is in part because “algorithms used in job matching have been shown to perpetuate gender 
bias” (Global Commission, 2019: 35).  
 
 
Technology and Labour Regulation 
One of the more worrisome aspects of the Report is the call for greater labour-market flexibility. 
This is in contrast with the earlier nuanced view of its Report on Jobs, wherein the Bank advised that 
labour policies “should remain on a range – a plateau – … and should avoid two cliffs: the 
distortionary interventions that clog the creation of jobs … and lack of mechanisms for voice and 
protection” (World Bank, 2012: 22) so that “regulations and institutions can at least partly address 
labour-market imperfections” (World Bank, 2012: 27). Instead, WDR 2019 argues that:  
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some labor regulations, specifically those with burdensome dismissal procedures.… More stringent 
regulations are also associated with lower entry and exit of firms – especially small firms – in industries 
in which labor moves more frequently between jobs (World Bank, 2018b: 116).  
 
The Report continues:  
 
Firms could be given more flexibility in managing their human resources contingent on the law 
mandating proper notice, the presence of an adequate system of income protection, and efficient 
mechanisms to punish discrimination (World Bank, 2018b: 117).  
 
There are two problems with the proposed approach. First, most governments only hear the 
first part of this message, which is often supported by employers: “Firms should be given more 
flexibility to hire and fire workers.” This practice is then implemented through labour law reforms 
without regard to the adverse consequences for the more vulnerable segments of the labour market. 
Second, evidence based on firm-level studies shows that stringent dismissal laws foster innovation, 
both in a cross-country and within-US context (Acharya, Baghai and Subramanian, 2010). The 
argument is basically that these laws provide workers with an opportunity to pursue value-
enhancing innovative activities in the long term, while they are not punished for the short-term 
failures. Further, the approach that the World Bank seems to argue fails to engage seriously with 
the need to adapt worker protection to economic and technological transformations. “Proper 
notice” is far too vague a term to provide meaningful protection, while discrimination has no 
specific relation to technological change. As far as “adequate” income protection is concerned, it 
amounts to shifting the responsibility and associated costs to protect workers against loss of income 
from companies to society (we return to this point in our last section on Technology and Social 
Protection).  
Rather than increasing flexibility, we argue that labour regulation must be strengthened in light 
of a detailed understanding of the implications of technological change in order to level the playing 
field and protect workers from abusive employer practices that instrumentalise technology. For 
instance, the widespread use of “gamification” (or the use of game elements such as point-scoring, 
levels, competition with others, and ratings) outside of game contexts as a labour management tool 
in the gig economy exposes workers to a serious risk of self-exploitation (Mason, 2018). 
Unfortunately, as we pointed out in the previous section, the Report does not discuss the evidence 
that deals with how work is being transformed. 
The WDR furthermore ignores the abundant evidence that links labour-market regulation with 
a range of positive socio-economic outcomes. Looking at the relationship between income 
inequalities and labour market regulation, Förster and Tóth (2015) find very robust results across 
a range of studies focusing on OECD countries, showing that a decline in regulation increases 
inequality. There is also evidence that shows that a rise in non-standard, precarious and informal 
employment, as a result of a decline in regulation, leads to increased labour-market inequality across 
a wide range of countries (Berg, 2015; OECD, 2015; Rani and Furrer, 2016). Moreover, Blanchard 
and Philippon (2004) have shown that the quality of labour relations, and the strength of trade 
unions in particular, were crucial factors in limiting the effects of changes in the economic 
environment on unemployment – or, to put it differently, countries with bad labour relations tend 
to have higher unemployment.  
The World Bank’s argument is also that fewer regulations lead to lower unemployment. 
Though this might be true in the short run, through a reduction in frictional unemployment, from 
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equitable outcomes, whether unemployment alone is the right indicator to assess, and whether the 
quality of employment should also be considered. Finally, the issue of stringency of labour-market 
regulation depends on how it is measured. Most of the empirical studies that look at stringency of 
labour regulations use de jure and not de facto measures, namely what is applied in practice. In spite 
of the complexity of laws, there is a tendency to measure rigidity in an aggregate manner, often 
resulting in only partial analysis and relations between different factors rather than an appropriate 
assessment of the situation.  
By coding ILO supervisory mechanisms and related sources, the Labour Rights Indicators 
(LRI) provides a picture of labour standards violations in law and in practice (Kucera and Sari, 
2018). On a scale of 1 to 10, where 10 indicates a complete lack of compliance with international 
labour standards, we can see extremely high levels of non-compliance in law and in practice in 
several prominent cases of countries producing for the global economy. This includes Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru and the Philippines. [See Figure 3.] What the 
Indicators suggest is that many countries do not need more flexible labour laws; rather, they need 
to strengthen their labour-relations regulations in order to come into compliance with international 
labour standards. This includes ensuring that laws do not limit the ability of workers to form 
unions, bargain and strike. It also includes – as noted above – ensuring effective compliance with 
the law, which entails having a well-staffed and trained labour inspectorate with the ability to 




Figure 3: Labour rights violations in law and in practice 
 
 
Labour regulations also need to address the challenges presented by the current economic 
context. In Latin America, many countries reformed their labour law to be more protective of 
workers in the wave of democratisation that swept the region in the 1980s and 1990s (Cook, 2007). 
Yet, often these reforms only marginally adjusted old laws; they did not, for example, address the 
challenges faced by workers in global supply chains that came to dominate many economies in the 
region (Anner, 2008).  
The challenge for labour regulation is complex given the powerful trends discussed above that 
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way in which technology has been deployed by companies. This is acknowledged in the WDR, 
which advocates that “labor codes should define more clearly what it means to be an employee in 
current labor markets” (World Bank, 2018b: 118). This argument is however framed in a 
problematic way, as it relates to the provision of social rights independently from employers, 
through a state-sponsored level playing field (see our critique in the section on Technology and 
Social Protection). A more promising initiative (which is not mentioned by the WDR) comes from 
a group of French labour-law scholars, the research group for an alternative labour code (PACT, 
in the French acronym).6 They have collectively developed a proposal for a complete overhaul of 
the French labour code; one of its key characteristics would be to assert the responsibility of 
employers towards the workers who depend on them, regardless of the formal link between them, 
explicitly including outsourced and contract workers. Taking the opposite view from that expressed 
in WDR 2019, the proposed code asserts the responsibility of employers towards workers; article 
L. 11-14. thus states, “The client is the employer of the outsourced worker, even if they use an 
intermediary”. The crucial point is therefore to establish the legal and financial responsibility of 
employers, rather than to exonerate them. The potential for such a necessary reform to be adopted 
will hinge on the mobilisation of social forces, in particular trade unions. Yet, as we will see in the 
next section, the WDR is rather dismissive about unions. 
Hence, while WDR 2013 warned against the consequences of a social race to the bottom, the 
most recent Report returns to the well-known argument in favour of a barely mitigated deregulation 
of labour markets. Individual workers ought to do well in the brave new economy, we are told, as 
long as they are properly skilled. Such a perspective ignores the unequal nature of labour relations 
and the evidence that employer–employee inequality appears to be getting worse, not least through 
the purposeful atomisation of workers employed via corporate-controlled platforms.7 
 
 
Technology and Trade Unions 
The World Bank Report suggests that trade unions and collective bargaining are becoming a less 
important mechanism for addressing the conditions of labour. The authors write:  
 
Strengthening the enforcement of labor laws and mechanisms to expand workers’ voices is a worthy 
goal…. Moving to a simpler core contract would require stronger collective bargaining structures as 
fewer protections are pre-specified in the law. However, the significance of such structures is 
declining: across high-income countries the share of workers covered by a collective agreement fell, 
on average, from 37 percent in 2000 to 32 percent in 2015. Also in 2015, 24 percent of employees 
were members of trade unions, down from 30 percent in 1985 (World Bank, 2018b: 108).  
 
In other words, rather than see the decline in union density and collective bargaining coverage as 
a call for concern that needs to be addressed with better laws and stricter enforcement, the World 
Bank seems to suggest the need to accept this decline and to look for other mechanisms to protect 
workers’ interests in times of technological change.  
This calls for a number of responses. Firstly, the important role of collective bargaining in 
ensuring more adaptable and more inclusive economies has been demonstrated by a number of 
                                                 
6 See <http://pct.parisnanterre.fr> (in French). 
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studies focused on emerging countries (Hayter and Lee, 2018). This includes examples of 
alternative forms of collective bargaining that improve the protection of informal-economy 
workers, as has been the case in India (Rani and Sen, 2018). There is ample evidence showing that 
the changing forms of work are undermining workers’ voices; it is crucial to respond to this through 
a combination of effective regulation and efforts to promote representative workers’ organisations. 
Collective bargaining constitutes an institutional mechanism through which such organisations can 
work with employers and states to ensure a broadening of the protection they have obtained for 
their members (Hayter and Visser, 2018). 
Secondly, the Report’s observation that union density has been in decline conflates two 
different issues in order to downplay the potential role of trade unions. On the one hand, it is 
beyond doubt that many trade unions that became powerful under Fordism have struggled to 
respond to changes in the world of work – and may well struggle even more with recent changes 
such as platform labour. On the other hand, the evidence of union renewal and labour activism, 
often in response to increasingly precarious forms of work, is compelling, if one cares to take it 
seriously. This is for instance what a project sponsored by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and called 
Trade Unions in Transformation8 has done; the numerous case studies reveal an impressive 
dynamism and suggest that there is an appetite from workers to be part of shaping the 
transformations that affect them (Herberg, 2018). New evidence is emerging which shows how 
unions build solidarity across different groups of workers in precarious work situations using a 
variety of creative campaigning and organising tactics (Doellgast, Lillie and Pulignano, 2018). 
Indeed, whether they are driving an Uber or delivering meals on bikes, workers around the world 
seem to believe that some form of trade union (that may differ from traditional ones) can best 
serve their interests by articulating their voice collectively. (Johnston and Land-Kazlauskas, 2018, 
address some of these issues.) 
This calls for a further comment, namely that the gig economy’s tendency to blur the line 
between micro-entrepreneur, self-employed and employed constitutes an obstacle to allowing 
workers to gain a meaningful voice (we return to this point in the next section). The widespread 
anti-union bias of many gig economy companies, in particular Amazon (Dubois 2016), suggests 
that such blurred lines may be created on purpose. It is therefore disappointing that the Report 
remains silent on the problem of the disempowerment of workers by companies, when it otherwise 
emphasises the importance of empowering citizens to make demands on states for improved 
service delivery.  
Third, supporting workers to organise and shape the future of work is not only a question of 
democracy; it has direct relevance to the way in which technological change is adopted and how it 
influences efficiency and social well-being. Canadian ergonomist Karen Messing (2014) shows how 
the “invisibility” of many low-paid workers in service sectors (mostly women) has led to ways of 
organising production that harm the workers’ health in a significant yet unnecessary manner – think 
of retail employees who are required to stand all the time, with dramatic consequences for their 
spines. 
Finally, the need to include workers in shaping technology in order to improve their well-being 
at the same time as improving efficiency (as there is no reason why the two cannot be positively 
correlated) points to the central importance of giving workers a voice as a socio-economic priority. 
The question the Report seeks to answer – How can the changes affecting work be influenced to 
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have a positive impact? – largely hinges on this. It is therefore extremely worrying that issues of 
concentration and authoritarian control over the direction of technological change are not 
addressed, except to warn against the risk of massive tax evasion, which is primarily a consequence 
of the liberalisation of financial flows, a reform the World Bank has enthusiastically embraced. 
 
 
Technology and Social Protection 
The World Bank Report emphasises the importance of moving towards universal social coverage 
in the face of changes in the nature of work. This might be appealing as a solution as it tries to be 
inclusive by taking into consideration those people who are not covered by contributory social 
protection, as well as including those in the informal sector. While the objective of extending social 
protection is a welcome idea, we argue that the World Bank’s analysis and recommendations are 
problematic with regard to four key respects. 
Firstly, the affordability concerns raised in the Report beg the question of what “universal 
coverage” actually means. There is an important difference between providing a lifeline and 
affording a decent level of socio-economic security. Recent trends, notably the growing 
participation of private providers in healthcare provision, have increased the unevenness of social 
welfare, since service provision to the poor is less profitable and, as a result, secondary. The Chilean 
case also shows how privatised pensions have led since the 1980s to concentration of incomes and 
profits in the hands of pension fund administrators, with the retirees earning insufficient or unequal 
pensions. The government then had to intervene by introducing the social component pillar to 
pensions to complement the insufficient pensions to lower-income groups, young workers and 
women (Borzutzky and Hyde, 2016). Going beyond a minimalist approach to social protection 
requires a different approach from the one presented in the Report, as we argue below. 
Secondly, the report underscores some of the initiatives that have been taken in developing 
countries to expand the coverage of social insurance systems. In some countries, such as Viet Nam, 
the thresholds have been lowered with regard to the duration of employment so that diverse groups 
of workers can access social insurance. In some Latin American countries such as Argentina, Brazil 
and Uruguay, the introduction of simplified payment mechanisms for own-account workers and 
micro entrepreneurs for taxes and social insurance mechanisms has led to significant extension of 
coverage. Social insurance mechanisms have also been extended to some vulnerable groups of 
workers such as agricultural workers (Ecuador) or domestic workers (Bolivia, South Africa) (ILO, 
2017b). 
Thirdly, what is proposed in the World Bank Report effectively amounts to shifting the entire 
burden of financing social protection to the national states. The Report is also quite explicit in 
saying that the expanded social coverage would pave the way for labour-market deregulation. Yet, 
such a suggestion is extremely problematic for two main reasons. From a fiscal point of view, 
requiring states where workers are located to pay for their social protection is tantamount to asking 
them to subsidise the profits made by corporations that are often located abroad; emphasising, as 
the Report does, the possibility of raising domestic excise taxes on sugar, tobacco or other goods 
and imposing indirect taxes is regressive and would hurt low-paid earners even more. Such a 
solution entails placing a huge burden on countries at the expense of the companies that are 
effectively employing workers and benefiting from their labour. Contributory systems have made 
it possible to involve corporations in the financing of healthcare; compared to tax-based systems, 
they also make it harder for political decision-makers to strip people of their entitlements in the 
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companies’ responsibility towards their dependent workers, as we have argued above. Researching 
the growing global platform economy, Rani and Furrer (2019) show that platform providers 
circumvent the existing regulatory framework and externalise the risks and responsibility on to the 
workers. Recognising these providers as employers and holding them accountable is all the more 
necessary for developing countries since platform-mediated work is associated with a marked 
geographical disconnect between the location of companies and that of workers.  
Last but not least, in line with most recent discussions of social policy, the World Bank Report 
focuses on financial issues rather than on provision systems, taking it for granted that the private 
sector will ensure efficient delivery. Yet, one can wonder what level of services the poor, in 
particular, are likely to receive under such a system. The emphasis on private provision or public–
private partnerships as an alternative to state provision of services for the many has come under 
intense scrutiny due to poor results. As Languille (2017: 15) puts it, “the key predictions of the PPP 
doctrine – cost-efficiency for improved service delivery to the poor – are hardly fulfilled in 
practice”. Conversely, contributory systems have historically allowed the construction of nationally 
owned healthcare systems that have delivered affordable, quality healthcare for the many. It would 
seem crucial, therefore, to link a discussion of social protection financing with one focused on 





The analysis presented in the World Development Report 2019 has the merit of anchoring its 
perspective on the changing nature of work in a discussion of evidence that helps mitigate the 
sometimes teleological views that have dominated many predictions on the impact of technology 
on society in general and labour in particular. However, the Report tends to cherry-pick data that 
suits well-known arguments derived from endogenous growth theory, emphasising the need to 
invest in technology (mainly to facilitate Internet access) and, especially, in skill formation in order 
for all countries to reap the benefits of the arguably far-reaching technological changes that are 
taking place. 
We have, through a detailed discussion of a number of key claims of the Report, sought to 
present a more nuanced picture of the likely impact of technological changes. Crucially, we have 
emphasised that adaptation to corporate-driven technological developments is by no means 
sufficient to ensure broad socio-economic benefits. We argue that it is vital for governments and 
workers to contest the rules of the game in order to reduce inequality and promote decent work. 
This means struggling for different policies from the ones advocated by the World Bank, for 
instance by emphasising public rather than private provision of social services, as well as proactive 
efforts to protect workers who are increasingly precarious – a trend that predates recent 
technological developments and is, by all accounts, accentuated by them.  
Contesting the rules of the game also requires, crucially, challenging the narrow and toxic 
corporate control over how technology is developed and deployed, an issue that is entirely ignored 
by the World Bank, who chooses again to focus only on opportunities. Data in particular is fast 
becoming the oil of the twenty-first century, a resource whose control is key to future wealth and 
power – and is as a result the subject of fierce, albeit partly hidden, battles over its control. The 
current use of data by large tech firms is presented as a way to make “the world” better but, unless 
their control over technological change is dramatically curtailed, it is likely that these firms will 
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for workers is that they generally have no participation in deciding what technology should be used 
… nor any say in what it does. Nor do they own the data, despite it being ‘produced’ by them while 
they are working” (Figueroa, 2018: 4). 
Control over data, and other forms of humanly-engineered technological change, is therefore 
a political issue that goes far beyond the world of work (Hugues, 2016; Srnicek, 2016). However, 
the collective agency of workers, probably more than any other group, has the potential to impose 
a debate on the direction of technology and its social usefulness. Yet, unless workers and unions 
lead the fight for decent work, they will indeed have to adapt and hope that the World Bank’s 
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